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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact that Corporate Governance 
characteristics have on firms’ tax rates. The fiscal implications of stronger or weaker 
shareholders powers have been studied in recent literature, but most of the studies 
regarding that matter focus on the effect that shareholders rights have on  firms’ current 
year’s tax related variables, considering indiscriminately firms with low, medium and 
high tax rates. However, we consider that stronger shareholders rights have different 
impacts on taxes, depending on whether firms have low or high tax rates. Thus, our 
paper contributes to prior research, by considering that current year’s tax rates must be 
considered when measuring the impact that shareholders rights have on next years’ tax 
rates. Thereby, we develop two different methodologies. In the first place, following 
prior research, our paper analyzes the relationship between Corporate Governance and 
current years’ tax rates, for the whole sample. Secondly, we create two firms groups – 
“excessive tax payers” and “tax savers” - according to their tax rates, and analyze their 
tax rates in the three years that follow an excessive or a low tax rate’s year. Our results 
support previous literature by showing that stronger shareholders rights tend to reduce 
current year’s tax burden. Additionally, they suggest that within the firms that have 
excessive tax rates in a given year, those with stronger shareholders rights have lower 
effective tax rates, relatively to those with weaker shareholders rights, on the following 
2 years. However, within the firms that have low tax rates in a given year, there is no 
significant relationship between shareholders rights and next three years’ tax rates. 
Thus, strong shareholders rights have a significant impact on firms with high tax rates 
but not on firms with low tax rates. This means that current year’s tax rate is a factor 
that must be taken into account in future investigations that study the link between 
Corporate Governance and taxes. 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
Index 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development ................................................. 4 
2.1. Literature Review ................................................................................................... 4 
2.2. Hypotheses Development ....................................................................................... 6 
3. Variables Description and Sample Selection ......................................................... 7 
3.1. Variables Description ............................................................................................. 7 
Tax variables ............................................................................................................. 7 
Corporate Governance variables ............................................................................... 8 
Firm-specific Variables ............................................................................................. 9 
3.2. Sample Selection .................................................................................................. 10 
4. Hypothesis 1 development ................................................................................... 12 
4.1. Methodology and Univariate Analysis................................................................. 12 
Model 1 .................................................................................................................... 12 
Model 2 .................................................................................................................... 15 
Model 3 .................................................................................................................... 17 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis ........................................................................................... 20 
5. Hypotheses 2 and 3: “Excessive tax payers” vs. “tax savers” ............................. 24 
6. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Investigations’ Perspectives ..................... 34 
7. References ............................................................................................................ 36 
8. Appendix .............................................................................................................. 38 
8.1. Appendix A – List of G-Index governance provisions ........................................ 38 
8.2. Appendix B – List of E-Index governance provisions ......................................... 40 
 
IV 
 
Tables Index 
 
 
Table 1. Variables definitions and databases ............................................................... 11 
Table 2. Panel A – Model 1 variables univariate analysis ........................................... 14 
              Panel B – Model 1 variables correlation matrix ............................................ 14 
Table 3. Panel A – Model 2 variables univariate analysis ........................................... 16 
              Panel B – Model 2 variables correlation matrix ............................................ 16 
Table 4. Panel A – Model 3 variables univariate analysis ........................................... 19 
              Panel B – Model 3 variables correlation matrix ............................................ 19 
Table 5. Model 1 regressions ....................................................................................... 21 
Table 6. Model 2 regressions ....................................................................................... 22 
Table 7. Model 3 regressions ....................................................................................... 23 
Table 8. Model 4 regressions for “excessive tax payers” ............................................ 28 
Table 9. Model 5 regressions for “excessive tax payers” ............................................ 29 
Table 10. Model 6 regressions for “excessive tax payers” .......................................... 30 
Table 11. Model 4 regressions for “tax savers” ........................................................... 31 
Table 12. Model 5 regressions for “tax savers” ........................................................... 32 
Table 13. Model 6 regressions for “tax savers” ........................................................... 33 
Corporate Governance and Taxes 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The conflicts between shareholders and managers have been documented for a 
long time. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that if managers try to maximize their 
utility, they will not always act in the best interests of the shareholders. Thus, on firms 
where shareholders actions are constrained, managers can act contrarily to the will of 
the shareholders and, more importantly, can manage the company for their own 
purposes, instead of managing it in order to maximize the companies’ value and the 
shareholders’ wealth. On the other extreme, on firms where management has few 
powers, shareholders have higher control and can easily replace directors. However, 
shareholders powers decreased significantly after the 1980s. Many firms created 
takeover defenses and managers’ protection clauses in response to a series of hostile 
takeovers in that decade. These clauses, which Gompers et al. (2003) define as 
“governance provisions”, increase managers’ security and decrease shareholders 
powers. 
These conflicts between managers and shareholders and its fiscal implications 
have been studied in recent literature. However, most of these studies only analyze the 
impact that Corporate Governance characteristics have on current year’s tax related 
variables. For instance, Minnick and Noga (2010) show that staggered boards are 
associated with higher tax rates, because stronger managers have fewer concerns with 
taxes. This means that if shareholders have more influence on a firm’s board, current 
year’s tax rates tend to be lower. Thus, it suggests that strong shareholders rights 
decrease current year’s effective tax rates.  
In our paper there are two key sets of variables: Corporate Governance variables 
and tax variables. Corporate Governance variables are mostly based on the governance 
provisions described above. Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2004) create 
their Corporate Governance indexes that quantify the shareholders/ managers power. 
Thus, to capture the effect that Corporate Governance has on taxes, we use the 
Governance Index (G-Index, from now on; Gompers et al., 2003) and the Entrenchment 
Index (E-Index, from now on; Bebchuk et al., 2004). Additionally, we use Insider 
Ownership as a measure of Corporate Governance. In order to measure effective tax 
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rates we use two measures proposed by Dyreng et al. (2008): GAAP ETR and multi-
year CASH ETR.  
Our paper develops two different methodologies. In the first place, our paper 
follows the approach of Minnick and Noga (2010) and analyzes the relationship 
between Corporate Governance and current years’ tax rates. Similarly to them, we use 
GAAP and 5-year CASH ETR’s as tax variables. However, Dyreng et al. (2008) argue 
that it is relevant to study firms’ ability to manage taxes over periods as long as ten 
years. Therefore, we additionally use 10-year CASH ETR, in order to capture the 
effects of Corporate Governance characteristics on effective tax rates for a longer 
period. Unlike Minnick and Noga’s study, ours won’t include governance variables that 
they consider, namely “Number of board members”, “The percentage of directors who 
are independent”, “Age of the CEO” and “Staggered Boards”, using instead G-Index, E-
Index and Insider Ownership. We expect that our results support the finding of Minnick 
and Noga (2010), by showing that stronger shareholders rights tend to reduce current 
years’ tax rates. 
In the second place, we argue that current year’s tax rates should be considered 
when analyzing the connection between Corporate Governance and next years’ taxes. 
We consider that stronger shareholders rights have different impacts on future taxes, 
depending on whether firms have high or low tax rates. Thus, our paper not only 
analyzes the relationship between Corporate Governance and current year’s tax rates, 
but also studies the reaction that firms with strong or weak shareholders rights have 
after a year of excessive or low tax rates. We develop a unique approach – as far as we 
know - to the link between Corporate Governance and taxes. We create two groups 
based on their effective tax rate. On one hand, we consider firms that have excessive tax 
rates in a given year which we called “excessive tax payers”; on the other hand, we take 
into account firms that have low tax rates in a given year (“tax savers”). For each firm 
that is an “excessive tax payer” or a “tax saver” we studied the effective tax rates in the 
following three years. This approach expands previous literature on the relationship 
between Corporate Governance and taxes in two ways. On one hand, we not only 
analyze the effects of Corporate Governance on taxes for an unrestricted sample, but 
also for two firms’ groups, which may reveal some group-specific effects. On the other 
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hand, we develop a dynamic analysis, by studying tax rates for the three years that 
follow an excessive or a low tax rate report.  We expect that within the “excessive tax 
payers”, the firms with stronger shareholders rights have lower tax rates, comparatively 
to those with weaker shareholders rights, during the years that follow an excessive tax 
rate’s year. However, we consider that stronger shareholders have fewer concerns with 
next years’ taxes when current tax rates are low. Therefore, we expect no significant 
relationship between Corporate Governance and tax rates for the firms within the “tax 
savers” group. 
Our results show that, for the whole sample, stronger shareholders rights are 
associated with lower effective tax rates, which is consistent with the findings of 
Minnick and Noga (2010). Additionally, they suggest that, within the firms that paid 
excessive tax rates in a given year, firms with stronger shareholders rights have lower 
effective tax rates, relatively to firms with weaker shareholders rights, during the next 2 
years. However, within the firms that paid low taxes in a given year, there is no 
evidence that suggests that Corporate Governance characteristics influence effective tax 
rates in the following years. These results suggest that current year’s tax rates must be 
taken into account when analyzing the connection between Corporate Governance and 
taxes, since Corporate Governance has a significant fiscal impact on next year´s tax 
rates for firms with high current tax rates but not on firms with low current tax rates. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 resumes previous 
literature on the relation between Corporate Governance and tax management activities 
and develops the paper’s hypothesis. Section 3 describes the variables and selects the 
sample. Section 4 explains the estimation procedure and shows the results of hypothesis 
1. Section 5 presents the results of hypotheses 2 and 3. The final section is a brief 
summary of the paper. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
 2.1. Literature Review 
 
There has been a large set of studies analyzing the various effects that Corporate 
Governance has on a firm. The majority of these studies try to measure the effect that 
strong shareholder rights has on firm’s performance and value (Chang and Zhang, 2010; 
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Brown and Caylor, 2006). Most of those studies conclude that 
stronger shareholder rights have a positive effect on both, although some others don’t 
find a significant relation between Corporate Governance and firm performance (Fodor 
and Diavastapoulos, 2010).  
However, previous literature on the nexus between Corporate Governance and 
tax rates is not as wide. Minnick and Noga’s study (2010) is the closest to ours and is 
one of the firsts – as far as we know - to analyze the relationship between Corporate 
Governance and taxes using CASH ETR as a tax measure. Their results show that 
staggered boards are associated with higher GAAP and 5-year CASH ETR’s. This 
means that stronger shareholder rights, particularly the ability to replace the boards, 
result in lower current year’s effective tax rates. However, other Corporate Governance 
variables, such as board size, independence and age of the CEO, are not strongly related 
with effective tax rates.  
Some studies lead to similar conclusions, despite not using the same 
methodology. Huang et al. (2010) find that firms with stronger shareholder rights have 
less income-increasing discretionary accruals. They conclude that stronger shareholder 
rights discourage managers from reporting excessive earnings; despite the fact that this 
study doesn’t directly analyze the impact of Corporate Governance variables on 
effective tax rates, we assume that shareholders discourage excessive earnings in order 
to reduce their firms’ tax burden. Thus, stronger shareholder rights also should prevent 
excessive effective tax rates. 
Despite the fact that there are few studies that study the connection between 
Corporate Governance and effective tax rates, there is a larger set of studies studying 
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the fiscal consequences of Corporate Governance characteristics. Nevertheless, many of 
those studies have been leading to ambiguous results. For instance, there is no 
consensus on the connection between Corporate Governance and the quality of financial 
reports. Baber et al. (2009) find that firms accounting misstatements are less common in 
firms with stronger shareholders powers. On the other hand, Carcello et al., (2006) find 
that entrenched managers help improving the quality of financial reports, which means 
that stronger management powers lead to better financial reports.  The same thing can 
be said about the link between Corporate Governance and earnings management. 
Chtourou et al. (2001) finds that larger boards with more experience and independent 
audit committees are associated with decreasing earnings management. Chen and Zhao 
(2008) show that staggered boards have fewer incentives to manage earnings. 
On another study, Klein (2002) focuses on the link between Corporate 
Governance and tax management. She shows that there is a significant negative relation 
between audit committee independence and tax management, which means that if an 
audit committee is independent there is a smaller probability that the firm will manage 
taxes. She also finds that, in the one hand, a CEO sitting on the board’s compensation 
committee increases tax management and, in the other hand, a large outside shareholder 
sitting on the board’s audit committee decreases tax management.  
Some other studies try to study the incentives of tax avoidance for firms with 
stronger and weaker governance.  Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find that firms with 
high levels of institutional ownership have higher incentives to incur in tax management 
activities. In another study (Desai and Dharmapala, 2004), they show that managers’ 
incentive compensation tend to reduce book-tax differences, and thereby, reduce tax 
avoidance. Desai, along with other authors (Desai et al. 2004), also studied the best 
fiscal policies for countries with stronger/ weaker governance firms. Their study shows 
that if a country’s firms have weaker governance, an increase in the tax rate can reduce 
tax revenues, via tax management. Then, if their companies have better Corporate 
Governance, countries have higher incentives to raise taxes, because these firms are less 
likely to incur in tax management activities. 
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 2.2. Hypotheses Development 
 
As described above, previous literature on Corporate Governance and taxes 
focus on the current tax variables. Our first hypothesis also tries to test the effect that 
stronger or weaker shareholders rights have on current year’s tax rates. So we try to find 
evidence that supports the findings of Minnick and Noga (2010). Thus, we expect that 
stronger shareholders rights result in lower tax rates. So H1 is defined as: 
H1: Stronger shareholders rights decrease effective tax rates. 
For the development of our second and third hypotheses, we create two groups 
based on their effective tax rate. We define “excessive tax payers” as the firms that have 
excessive tax rates in a given year and “tax savers” as those who have low tax rates in a 
given year. Hypothesis 2 is centered on the “excessive tax payers” group and hypothesis 
3 on the “tax savers” group. Similarly to H1, we expect that, within the “excessive tax 
payers” group, the firms with stronger shareholders rights are those with the lowest 
effective tax rates during the years that follow an excessive tax rate report. Huang et al. 
(2010) argue that stronger shareholders rights avoid excessive earnings. We consider 
that by doing so, shareholders aim to reduce firm’s tax burden. Thus, stronger 
shareholders powers should avoid excessive tax rates. This means that following a year 
of excessive tax rates, firms with stronger shareholders rights should have lower tax 
rates than firms with weaker shareholder rights. So, H2 can be defined as: 
H2: Within the firms that have excessive tax rates in a given year, those with 
stronger shareholders rights have lower effective tax rates, comparatively to those with 
weaker shareholders rights, during the next k years (where k = 1,2,3). 
Our third hypothesis analyzes the “tax savers” group. As said before, we try to 
demonstrate that current year’s tax rates is a factor that must be taken into account when 
analyzing Corporate Governance and tax rates. Therefore, we expect that stronger 
shareholders rights have different impacts on next years’ tax rates, depending on 
whether firms have a current excessive tax rate or a current low tax rate. We argue that 
shareholders have more concerns when tax rates are high but not so much when they are 
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low. Thus, we expect that stronger shareholders rights on firms with current year’s low 
tax rates have no significant impact on next years’ tax rates. So H3 can be defined as:  
H3: Within the firms that have low tax rates in a given year, stronger 
shareholders rights have no significant impact on next k years’ effective tax rates, years 
(where k =1,2,3). 
 
3. Variables Description and Sample Selection 
 
 3.1. Variables Description 
 
 As described above, our hypotheses test the impact that Corporate Governance 
has on effective tax rates (on the whole sample for hypothesis 1 and for two subsamples 
for hypotheses 2 and 3). This subsection describes and explains tax variables, Corporate 
Governance measures and firm-specific variables that are used in this paper’s models. 
 
Tax variables 
 
 To measure effective tax rates we use GAAP ETR and 5-year and 10-year 
CASH ETR’s (Dyreng et al. (2008)). GAAP ETR is an annual rate defined as: 
 
             
               
                 
 
 
However, this one-year measure is not the best to the purpose of this study. There may 
occur some significant yearly variations that are not seized by GAAP ETR. Also, by 
using Tax Expense in the numerator, it does not take into account deferred tax expense 
 (3.A) 
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(3.B) 
and refunds from the IRS. To solve those problems, Dyreng et al. (2008), propose a 
multi-year rate (5 or 10 years, in this study) defined as: 
 
           
                      
                                          
 
 
 For instance, if we want to calculate the CASH ETR value of a firm in 1990, we 
sum the cash taxes paid and the pretax incomes less special items during the period 
1981-1990 (for a 10 year rate) or during the period 1986-1990 (for a 5 year rate). On the 
one hand, this will decrease the effects of years with unusually large or small effective 
tax rates, relatively to the GAAP ETR and, on the other, will take into account deferred 
tax expenses. Comparatively to other studies, this will be one of the firsts (to our 
knowledge) to use 10-year CASH ETR as an effective tax rate. We add this variable 
because Dyreng et al. (2008) argue that it is pertinent to test the ability that firms have 
in avoiding taxes over periods as long as ten years.  
 
Corporate Governance variables 
 
In order to measure Corporate Governance characteristics, we use two Corporate 
Governance indexes and Insider Ownership. By considering Insider Ownership 
individually, there could be revealed some effects associated to that variable. Also, the 
use of two indexes may reveal that effective tax rates are impacted by some Corporate 
Governance provisions, but not by all of them. 
The first Corporate Governance measure is the Governance Index (G-Index; 
Gompers et al. (2003)). This index considers 24 governance provisions
1
 that reduce 
shareholders powers. A firm’s score ranges from 0 to 24 and high scores reflect high 
                                                          
1
 G-Index’s governance provisions are described on appendix A. 
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management power or weak shareholders rights; on the contrary low scores are a sign of 
low management power or strong shareholders rights (Gompers et al., 2003).  
The second measure is the Entrenchment Index (E-Index; Bebchuk et al. 
(2004)). Their authors argue that E-Index is more refined index than G-Index, because it 
only takes into account the 6 most important governance provisions
2
, instead of the 
original G-Index’s 24. A firm’s score ranges from 0 to 6 and similarly to the G-Index a 
high (low) score is associated with weak (strong) shareholders rights and high (weak) 
management power.  
Both indexes apply their scores to 1500 companies from the Standard & Poor’s 
500 as well as from the annual lists of the largest corporations in the publications of 
Fortune, Forbes, and Businessweek. 
Additionally, we use Insider Ownership (Ins_Owner) as a Corporate Governance 
measure. Previous research has shown that a higher percentage of outside directors has 
a positive impact on stock returns (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Weisbach, 1988). We 
argue that the percentage of shares owned by insiders could also impact effective tax 
rates. This variable is defined, by DataStream, as the percentage of shares owned by 
officers, directors and their immediate families, shares held in trust, shares of the 
company held by any other corporation, shares held by pension/benefit plans and shares 
held by individuals who hold more than 5% or more of the outstanding shares.  
 
Firm-specific Variables 
 
 In this study, we use a set of variables to measure firm characteristics that may 
affect effective tax rates. By using them, we control for firm-specific characteristics, 
like size, growth, capital intensity, debt and profitability.  
 As Dyreng et al. (2008) suggested, firms’ size and growth influence effective tax 
rates. Thus, following Minnick and Noga (2010), we use the variable assets in its 
                                                          
2
 E-Index’s governance provisions are described on appendix B. 
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logarithmic form (Log_Assets) to control the firms’ size and the ratio between the book 
value of equity and its market value (BM) as a proxy of firms’ growth 
 Secondly, we consider the effects of amortizations and depreciations on effective 
tax rates. So, we use the ratio between non-current assets and total assets 
(Cap_Intensity) to measure companies’ capital intensity. 
 Many authors (Minnick and Noga, 2010; Huang et al., 2010; Noor et al., 2010; 
Baber et al., 2009) highlight the importance of debt tax shields and the importance of 
controlling for that. In order to do so, we use the ratio debt-to-equity (DTE). 
 Minnick and Noga (2010) argue that firms with negative earnings should be 
controlled, because their inclusion on the regression may lead to biased analysis and 
results. To control for these firms, we use a dummy variable (D_Earn) that is equal to 
one if earnings are positive and zero otherwise. 
 Additionally, we use the variable Return on Assets (ROA) as a measure of 
firms’ profitability (accordingly to Noor et al., 2010). 
 
 3.2. Sample Selection 
 
G-Index and E-Index’s scores were collected from Yale School of Management 
and on Harvard Law School’s online databases, respectively. Both indexes’ scores are 
available only for the years of 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006 and 
cover 1500 companies from the Standard & Poor’s 500 as well as from the annual lists 
of the largest corporations in the publications of Fortune, Forbes, and Businessweek. 
We follow the data treatment proposed by Huang et al. (2010), in order to expand the 
years analyzed. They had discussions with the author of the IRRC publications and 
found that a firm’s E-Index’s score applies to more than just one year. In fact, a firm’s 
score in one year can be applied to the subsequent or previous years in most cases. With 
that in mind, we analyzed the scores for the G-Index and for the E-Index and found that 
they were very regular during those years, for the large majority of the firms. So we 
assume that the G-Index and E-Index’ scores for the fiscal year of 1990, can be applied 
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to 1991 and 1992; the scores of 1993 to 1994; the scores of 1995 to 1996 and 1997; the 
scores of 1998 to 1999; the scores of 2000 to 2001; the scores of 2002 to 2003; the 
scores of 2004 to 2005; and the scores of 2006 to 2007.  
The construction of tax variables required a collection of DataStream’s data 
from 1983 to 2007 in order to be able to calculate multi-year CASH ETR’s. All the 
other variables, including Insider Ownership and firm-specific variables, were extracted 
from DataStream’s database from 1990 to 2007. Table 1 resumes the variables, their 
construction and their sources. 
 
Table 1 – Variables definitions and databases 
Variable Definition Database 
Tax Variables 
GAAP ETR Tax expense/pretax income DataStream 
5-year CASH ETR                                                  
 
   DataStream 
10-year CASH ETR                                                   
  
   DataStream 
Corporate Governance Variables 
E Index 6 governance provisions Lucian Bebchuk’s 
Database 
G Index 24 governance provisions Andrew Metrick’s 
Database 
Ins_Owner Percentage of shares owned by insiders DataStream 
Firm-specific Variables 
Assets Total assets DataStream 
Cap_Intensity Non-current assets/ total assets DataStream 
BM Book value of equity/ market value of equity DataStream 
DTE Debt/ equity DataStream 
D_Earn Equals to 1 if earnings > 0; 0 otherwise DataStream 
ROA Net income/ total assets DataStream 
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4. Hypothesis 1 development 
 
4.1. Methodology and Univariate Analysis 
 
 In this subsection we explain the methodology used to test hypothesis 1. As 
described above, hypothesis 1 suggests that stronger shareholders rights decrease 
effective tax rates.  
 In order to measure the effect of corporate governance variables on taxes we use 
three different approaches. Nevertheless, the methodology used on the three models is 
similar. We use OLS estimations with year and SIC-code industry fixed effects for all 
three of them
3, with outliers’ exclusion (1%) for all the variables in order to create more 
centric estimations. Furthermore, we only consider positive (but not bigger than 100%) 
values for the effective tax rates, because many of the negative results were due to 
negative income and not tax refunding. So, considering them might bias our analysis. 
The explanatory variables are the same for the three models and the only difference 
between the models relies on the dependent variable.  
 
 Model 1 
 
 On the first model we use the tax variable GAAP ETR and on the second and on 
the third models we use CASH ETR for 5 and 10 years, respectively. Each model has 
three equations, depending if the corporate governance variable is the E-Index, the G-
Index or Insider Ownership. For all three models we use the firms-specific variables 
described above to control for size, growth, debt, capital intensity and profitability. 
Thus, the first model’s equations are the followings: 
                                                          
3
 The Hausman test rejected the hypothesis of random effects’ estimators being efficient and confirmed 
the hypothesis of fixed effects’ estimators being consistent, for both SIC-code industry code and year 
effects. 
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(4.A) 
 
(4.B) 
 
(4.C) 
 
                                                         
                       
 
                                                        
                        
 
                                                             
                             
  
 This analysis covers the years from 1990 to 2007 and with the data treatment 
described above the sample is restricted to 9211 year-firm observations. Panel A of 
Table 2 shows the univariate analysis for all the variables and Panel B shows the 
Pearson’s correlations’ matrix. 
 As panel A shows, most of the firms have strong shareholders rights. Both E-
Index (its mean and median are, respectively, 2.431 and 3) and G-Index (9.4 and 9 
respectively) have small values (E-Index ranges from 0 to 6 G-Index from 0 to 24). 
Although some firms were able to get the maximum E-Index score, the highest G-Index 
score for this sample (18) was far from the maximum G-Index value (24). We can also 
conclude that the sample is majorly constituted by large firms with strong capital 
intensity (most firms have more than 50% of non-current assets). Also, many of the 
firms of this sample have a market value much higher than its book value (most of the 
firms have a market value that is the double of the book value). We can also deduce that 
92.4% of the firms have positive earnings. 
 Panel B shows that there is no indication of linear correlation between the 
explanatory variables. As expected, and because the E-Index is based on a sub-set of the 
original G-Index provisions, these variables have a strong positive correlation (0.685). 
All the other variables are weakly correlated, with the exception of D_Earn and ROA 
(0.584).  
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Table 2 – Panel A – Model 1 variables’ univariate analysis 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
GAAP ETR 0,339 0,109 0,000 0,356 0,999 
E Index 2,431 1,283 0,000 3,000 6,000 
G Index 9,400 2,696 2,000 9,000 18,000 
Ins_Owner 14,199 15,311 0,040 10,700 81,480 
Assets 5.058.907 9.541.312 48.916 1.547.900 106.159.000 
Cap_Intensity 0,556 0,218 0,056 0,560 0,953 
BM 0,462 0,293 0,008 0,408 2,253 
DTE 1,579 1,639 0,009 1,177 18,363 
D_Earn 0,924 0,266 0,000 1,000 1,000 
ROA 0,060 0,070 -0,537 0,057 0,307 
 
Table 2 – Panel B – Model 1 variables’ correlation matrix 
 
 
 
  
GAAP 
ETR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 E Index 0,018                 
2 G Index 0,050 0,685               
3 Ins_Owner -0,013 -0,200 -0,213             
4 Assets 0,003 -0,119 0,013 -0,207           
5 Cap_Intensity 0,098 0,106 0,107 -0,197 0,235         
6 BM 0,029 0,067 0,001 0,048 -0,087 0,117       
7 DTE 0,023 0,085 0,098 -0,039 0,198 0,250 -0,019     
8 D_Earn 0,214 0,013 0,063 -0,073 0,058 0,059 -0,236 -0,085   
9 ROA 0,152 -0,078 -0,024 -0,026 0,017 -0,123 -0,429 -0,232 0,584 
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(4.D) 
 
(4.E) 
 
(4.F) 
 Model 2 
 
 On the second model we use CASH ETR for 5 years as the dependent variable. 
Similarly to the first model, we have three equations, depending whether the corporate 
governance variable is the E-Index, the G-Index or Insider Ownership. So the equations 
are the followings: 
 
                                                           
                       
 
                                                          
                        
 
                                                               
                             
 
 The results of this model should be a lot more conclusive than the results of the 
first model. Even though the sample is considerably smaller, because every observation 
requires data from 5 years in a row, the estimations should be a lot more significant: this 
5-year range may capture some long-term tax management activities. 
 This analysis covers the years from 1991 to 2007. It should be noted that, for 
example, the values of CASH ETR for the year 1991 comprehend tax data between 
1987 and 1991 (hence the 5-year range of this measure). The sample is restricted to 
4887 year-firm observations. Panel A of Table 3 shows the univariate analysis for all 
the variables and Panel B shows the Pearson’s correlations’ matrix. 
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Table 3 –Panel A – Model 2 variables’ univariate analysis 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
CASH ETR 0,176 0,158 0,000 0,131 0,995 
E Index 2,397 1,297 0,000 2,000 6,000 
G Index 9,491 2,738 2,000 9,000 18,000 
Ins_Owner 13,413 14,831 0,040 9,560 82,340 
Assets 6.293.738 12.355.912 91.079 1.839.100 135.695.000 
Cap_Intensity 0,553 0,212 0,043 0,560 0,952 
BM 0,416 0,281 0,018 0,357 4,954 
DTE 1,413 1,343 0,004 1,076 15,272 
D_Earn 0,950 0,219 0,000 1,000 1,000 
ROA 0,074 0,059 -0,224 0,069 0,320 
 
Table 3 – Panel B  - Model 2 variables’ correlation matrix 
 
 
 
  
CASH 
ETR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 E Index 0,053 
       
 
2 G Index 0,067 0,675 
      
 
3 Ins_Owner -0,059 -0,177 -0,212 
     
 
4 Assets 0,093 -0,149 0,004 -0,202 
    
 
5 Cap_Intensity -0,058 0,137 0,146 -0,216 0,229 
   
 
6 BM 0,111 0,084 0,022 0,053 -0,077 0,149 
  
 
7 DTE 0,162 0,117 0,169 -0,074 0,189 0,292 -0,010 
 
 
8 D_Earn -0,109 0,020 0,042 -0,076 0,048 0,031 -0,238 -0,015  
9 ROA -0,236 -0,126 -0,097 0,011 0,001 -0,241 -0,488 -0,238 0,466 
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(4.G) 
 
(4.H) 
The conclusions from the variables’ univariate analysis are similar to the first 
model. After all, this subset of firms is a sub-sample of the first model’s sample. As 
panel A shows, most of the firms have low E-Index and G-Index scores which reiterates 
the idea that most of the firms of the sample have strong shareholders rights. Comparing 
the statistical scores for GAAP ETR (table 1, panel A) and CASH ETR (table 2, panel 
B), we can see that there is an enormous difference in the values. This shows that firms’ 
5-year CASH ETR is much smaller than GAAP ETR (the mean and the median of each 
are, respectively, 0.176 vs. 0.339 and 0.131 vs. 0.356) which is consistent with the 
findings of Minnick and Noga, 2010). 
There is still no evidence of linear correlation problems, notwithstanding that 
ROA has some high correlation values (-0,488 with BM and 0,466 with D_Earn). 
Unlike the model 1, three firm-specific variables have negative correlations with CASH 
ETR, while in the first model none of the variables was negatively correlated with 
GAAP ETR. 
 
 Model 3 
 
 On the third model we use CASH ETR for 10 years as the dependent variable. 
This is an unused measure of effective tax rates on previous literature on the nexus 
between Corporate Governance and taxes, but we expect similar results to 5-year CASH 
ETR. We have three equations, depending whether the corporate governance variable is 
the E-Index, G-Index or Insider Ownership. So the equations are the followings: 
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 (4.I) 
 
                                                                
                             
  
 The sample is even smaller than the one on model 2, because now every 
observation requires data from 10 years in a row. Similarly to the model 2, this 10-year 
range may capture some long-term tax management activities. 
 This analysis will cover the years from 1992 to 2007. It should be noted that, for 
example, the values of CASH ETR for the year 1992 comprehend tax activity between 
1983 and 1992 (hence the 10-year range of this measure). The sample is restricted to 
2582 year-firm observations. Panel A of Table 4 shows the univariate analysis for all 
the variables and Panel B shows the Pearson’s correlations’ matrix. 
 All the statistical scores are very similar to the second model, so the univariate 
analysis is identical. Equally to 5-year CASH ETR, 10-year CASH ETR is much 
smaller than GAAP ETR (the means are, respectively, 0.187 and 0.339 and the medians 
are 0.143 and 0.356). 
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Table 4 –Panel A – Model 3 variables univariate analysis 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
CASH ETR 0,187 0,155 0,000 0,143 0,990 
E Index 2,443 1,290 0,000 3,000 5,000 
G Index 9,641 2,653 2,000 10,000 18,000 
Ins_Owner 12,734 14,335 0,040 8,945 82,580 
Assets 8.506.920 16.859.910 107.435 2.390.591 164.719.000 
Cap_Intensity 0,558 0,201 0,047 0,572 0,953 
BM 0,409 0,260 0,023 0,352 1,890 
DTE 1,490 1,528 0,029 1,095 17,750 
D_Earn 0,945 0,227 0,000 1,000 1,000 
ROA 0,073 0,058 -0,186 0,068 0,317 
 
Table 4 – Panel B  - Model 3 variables’ correlation matrix 
 
 
 
  
CASH 
ETR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 E Index 0,038 
       
 
2 G Index 0,039 0,627 
      
 
3 Ins_Owner -0,069 -0,168 -0,195 
     
 
4 Assets 0,079 -0,220 -0,052 -0,194 
    
 
5 Cap_Intensity -0,071 0,157 0,142 -0,234 0,206 
   
 
6 BM 0,048 0,158 0,046 0,069 -0,128 0,167 
  
 
7 DTE 0,149 0,098 0,162 -0,070 0,120 0,296 -0,085 
 
 
8 D_Earn -0,095 0,013 0,026 -0,063 0,064 0,025 -0,253 -0,012  
9 ROA -0,173 -0,135 -0,089 0,028 0,055 -0,257 -0,533 -0,205 0,477 
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 4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
 
 This subsection analyzes the results of the models described above. The results 
for models 1, 2 and 3 are shown on tables 5, 6 and 7 respectively.  
 As the tables demonstrate, there is a positive relationship between the Corporate 
Governance indexes’ scores and effective tax rates. In fact, tables 5 and 6 shows that the 
coefficients associated with the Corporate Governance indexes show a significant 
positive relation with GAAP ETR and 5-year CASH ETR. Table 7 is not as elucidative: 
the coefficient associated with E-Index has the expected sign but is not significant; 
furthermore, G-Index appears to have a negative relationship with 10-year CASH ETR 
(although it is not significant either). On the other hand, all the tables show that there is 
no significant relationship between Insider Ownership and effective tax rates.  
 As for the firm-specific variables, the results suggest that higher tax rates are 
associated with bigger firms (consistent with Rego, 2003) and with firms who have 
higher growth potential (consistent with Dyreng et al., 2008), particularly on tables 6 
and 7. However, other variables’ coefficients aren’t as conclusive: table 5 points to 
different conclusions than tables 6 and 7. For instance, tables 6 and 7 suggest that firms 
with higher capital intensity tend to have lower tax rates, which could reflect the effect 
of higher depreciations and amortizations; yet, the results on table 5 point to the 
contrary.  
 Although the lack of significance with 10-year CASH ETR, globally the results 
seem to indicate that there is a positive relationship between Corporate Governance 
indexes and effective tax rates, both on GAAP ETR and on 5-year CASH ETR’s 
estimations. Given that high (low) scores on the indexes imply weakest (strongest) 
shareholders powers, the results mean that stronger shareholders powers lead to lower 
effective tax rates. These results are consistent with H1 and with the findings of Huang 
et al. (2010) and Minnick and Noga (2010). 
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Table 5 – Model 1 regressions. On regression 1 the Corporate Governance variable considered was E-Index. 
Regression 2 uses G-Index as the Corporate Governance variable. Regression 3 uses Insider Ownership as the 
Corporate Governance variable. For all the regressions there were used year and SIC code industry controls. All 
variables’ outliers were excluded at the 1% level. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * 
means 10% individual significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the 
corresponding variable and *** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are 
the observed t-statistic values. 
Dependent Variable: GAAP ETR 
 
1 2 3 
C  
0,222512***  0,22111***  0,227958***  
(4,734845) (4,705547)  (4,80445) 
E_INDEX  
0,002053** 
  
(2,353249) 
  
G_INDEX  
 
0,001255*** 
 
 
(3,012399) 
 
INS_OWNWERSHIP 
  
-0,000064 
  
(-0,815603) 
LOG(ASSETS)  
-0,000196 -0,000602 -0,000533 
(-0,221221)  (-0,676248) (-0,578742)  
CAP_INTENSITY  
0,052341***  0,052368***  0,053854***  
(6,891512) (6,909339) (7,117818) 
BM  
0,030556***  0,030741***  0030990***  
(6,794225) (6,838956) (6,885291) 
DTE  
0,001637**  0,001655**  0,001789**  
(2,174368) (2,200778) (2,368225) 
D_EARN  
0,058409***  0,058041***  0,058992***  
(11,50703) (11,42820) (8,150903) 
ROA  
0,175626***  0,176030***  0,173063***  
(8,264047) (8,286382) (8,150903) 
    
R
2
  0,150972 0,151301 0,150519 
Adjusted R
2 
 0,143158 0,143489 0,1427 
    
Sample Size  9211 9211 9211 
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Table 6 - Model 2 regressions. On regression 1 the Corporate Governance variable considered was E-Index. 
Regression 2 uses G-Index as the Corporate Governance variable. Regression 3 uses Insider Ownership as the 
Corporate Governance variable. For all the regressions there were used year and SIC code industry controls. All 
variables’ outliers were excluded at the 1% level. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * 
means 10% individual significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the 
corresponding variable and *** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are 
the observed t-statistic values. 
Dependent Variable: CASH ETR (5 Years) 
 
1 2 3 
C  
-0,026327  -0,016131  0,00356  
(-0,9566961) (-0,348491)  (0,075913) 
E_INDEX  
0,005694*** 
  
(3,285561) 
  
G_INDEX  
 
0,001781** 
 
 
(2,164965) 
 
INS_OWNWERSHIP 
  
-0,000172 
  
(-1,088454) 
LOG(ASSETS)  
0,018822*** 0,017871*** 0,017586*** 
(10,52232)  (10,01731) (9,466694)  
CAP_INTENSITY  
-0,174719***  -0,172511***  -0,170235***  
(-11,116) (-0,98257) (-10,86596) 
BM  
0,046441***  0,046673***  0,047108***  
(4,974777) (4,996662) (5,037226) 
DTE  
0,015673***  0,015773***  0,0162***  
(8,58546) (8,631719) (8,849528) 
D_EARN  
0,00868  0,009364  0,01032  
(0,779136) (0,839973) (0,926349) 
ROA  
-0,584395***  -0,589807***  -0,595759***  
(-12,10644) (-12,22257) (-12,36037) 
    
R
2
  0,187020 0,185988 0,185396 
Adjusted R
2
  0,174003 0,172955 0,172353 
    
Sample Size  4887 4887 4887 
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Table 7 - Model 3 regressions. On regression 1 the Corporate Governance variable considered was E-Index. 
Regression 2 uses G-Index as the Corporate Governance variable. Regression 3 uses Insider Ownership as the 
Corporate Governance variable. For all the regressions there were used year and industry controls. All variables’ 
outliers were excluded at the 1% level. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * means 10% 
individual significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the corresponding 
variable and *** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are the observed t-
statistic values. 
Dependent Variable: CASH ETR (10 Years) 
 
1 2 3 
C  
-0,039396  -0,023409  -0,026958  
(-0,52967) (-0,31557)  (-0,359981) 
E_INDEX  
0,002639 
  
(1,080358) 
  
G_INDEX  
 
-0,001233 
 
 
(-1,065151) 
 
INS_OWNWERSHIP 
  
-0,000062 
  
(-0,275841) 
LOG(ASSETS)  
0,018076*** 0,017784*** 0,017451*** 
(7,718546)  (7,691783) (7,207553)  
CAP_INTENSITY  
-0,182592***  -0,17743***  -0,17974***  
(-8,213649) (-8,021623) (-8,144222) 
BM  
0,051668***  0,053406***  0,052914***  
(3,469848) (3,590116) (4,554549) 
DTE  
0,018916***  0,01927***  0,019121***  
(8,431775) (8,574434) (8,503693) 
D_EARN  
-0,001765  -0,000277  -0,001107  
(-0,12071) (-0,018957) (-0,075737) 
ROA  
-0,455937***  -0,459214***  -0,457745***  
(-6,523102) (-6,572801) (-6,547807) 
    
R
2
  0,201496 0,201486 0,201149 
Adjusted R
2
  0,178254 0,178243 0,177897 
    
Sample Size  2582 2582 2582 
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5. Hypotheses 2 and 3: “Excessive tax payers” vs. “tax savers” 
 
 Although the results for the whole sample indicate that strong shareholders 
rights reduce companies’ tax burden, this trend may not be verified for all firms. We 
particularly emphasize two groups: “excessive tax payers” and “tax savers”. Previous 
literature on Corporate Governance and taxes focus on the effects that stronger 
shareholders rights have on a tax related variable, for a sample that indiscriminately 
contains firms with low, medium and high tax rates. In this section, we focus on firms 
that have high or low tax rates in a given year, and analyze the impact that Corporate 
Governance has on next three years’ tax rates. By doing so, we try to demonstrate that 
current year’s tax rates must be taken into account when analyzing Corporate 
Governance and tax rates. Thereby, we expect that stronger shareholders rights have 
different impacts on next years’ tax rates, depending on whether firms have a current 
excessive tax rate or a current low tax rate. 
 The “excessive tax payers” group contains firms that have effective tax rates 
(either GAAP or multi-year CASH ETR’s) higher than 40% and the “tax savers” group 
contains all the firms that have effective tax rates lower than 10% on a given year. 
Then, for each year that a firm had excessive or low tax rates we analyze the effective 
tax rates for the following three years. If an “excessive tax payer” has strong 
shareholders rights, it is expected, according to H2, that the effective tax rates will be 
smaller than on firms with weak shareholders rights, in the next years. According to H3, 
we can’t say the same thing about the “tax savers” group, because we consider that 
stronger shareholders have fewer concerns with next years’ taxes when current year’s 
tax rates are low. 
 This constitutes a new approach to the link between Corporate Governance and 
taxes, so there is no evidence on literature that support the definition of the reference tax 
rates of 40% for “excessive tax payers” and 10% for “tax savers”.  
 However, we consider that those values are appropriate. On the first place, the 
maximum federal marginal tax rate in the United States is 35%
4
, so 40% seems like an 
                                                          
4
 For the year of 2012 
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appropriate value to distinguish between excessive and non-excessive tax payers. 
Besides, the mean of the highest deciles of the distributions of GAAP and 5-year and 
10-year CASH ETR’s is very close to 40% (38.98%).  
 10% also seems like an appropriate value to distinguish between tax savers and 
non-savers because the minimum federal marginal tax rate in the United States is 15%
5
. 
The mean of the lowest deciles of the distributions of GAAP and 5-year and 10-year 
CASH ETR’s is very close to 10% (10.05%). Furthermore, we believe that the 
conclusions for those reference tax rates may be extensible to another tax rates. 
 Similarly to the models of Hypothesis 1, we construct 3 additional models, 
depending on the dependent variable. However, in all the following models we don’t 
use the variable Insider Ownership as a measure of Corporate Governance, due to its 
lack of significance revealed on previous estimations. Similarly to the H1 procedure, we 
use OLS estimations with year and SIC-code industry fixed effects for all three models
6
, 
with outliers’ exclusion (1%) for all the variables in order to create more centric 
estimations. Also, we only consider positive (but not bigger than 100%) values for the 
effective tax rates, because many of the negative results were due to negative income 
and not tax refunding and considering them could bias our analysis. 
 Model 4 uses GAAP ETR as dependent variable. However, because we try to 
verify the effect of Corporate Governance on effective tax rates in 3 years following an 
excessive/ low tax rate, in this model we use GAAP ETR for the year t+k (where 
k=1,2,3). Similarly, all control variables values considered are related to the year t+k. 
However both E and G Indexes scores are for the year t. We use this methodology, 
because we want to test if a firm that has excessive or low tax rates and strong 
shareholder rights, in this moment, will decrease his tax burden in the next three years. 
Thus, the variable that represents Corporate Governance must reflect current year 
situation. 
 
                                                          
5
 For the year of 2012 
6
 The Hausman test rejected the hypothesis of random effects’ estimators being efficient and confirmed 
the hypothesis of fixed effects’ estimators being consistent. 
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(5.A) 
 
(5.B) 
 
(5.C) 
                                                                   
                                         
 
 This model will be used both for “excessive tax payers” as for “tax savers”. 
Model 5 and 6 are similar to 4, with the only difference being the dependent variable.  
  
                                                           
                                                          
 
 
                                                            
                                                           
 
 This new approach has two important contributions to previous literature. In the 
first place, to our knowledge, we are the firsts to analyze not only the whole sample but 
also two firms’ groups. This methodology should isolate some effects that are specific 
to each group. Secondly, we develop a dynamic analysis, by studying the impact that 
stronger shareholders rights have on the effective tax rates on the years that follow an 
excessive or a low tax report. 
 Tables 8, 9 and 10 suggest that “excessive tax payers” with low governance 
indexes’ scores (particularly E-Index) significantly have lower effective tax rates, 
comparatively to those with high governance indexes’ scores, during the 2 years that 
follow a year of an excessive effective tax rate. However, G-Index lacks some 
significance, particularly on tables 7 and 9. This lack of significance may occur because 
E-Index is, according to their authors (Bebchuk et al., 2004), a more refined index in 
comparison with G-Index, by taking into account only the 6 most important governance 
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provisions, whereas G-Index contain some governance provisions that may bias the 
results and may lead to this lack of significance.  
 These results mean that within the firms that belong to the “excessive tax 
payers” group, those with stronger shareholders rights have lower taxes, relatively to 
those with weaker shareholders rights, during two years. This means that after a year of 
excessive tax rates, the firms with stronger shareholders rights are the ones with the 
lowest effective tax rates during the next 2 years, which is consistent with H2.  
 As for H3, as expected, Tables 11, 12 and 13 show that there is no significant 
relation between governance indexes’ scores and effective tax rates for any considered 
period. In fact, only table 13 (and only for G-Index) suggests that amongst the “tax 
savers” firms, those who have strong shareholders rights have the lowest effective tax 
rates during the years following a low tax rate report. This lack of significance could 
mean that Corporate Governance characteristics have a more significant role on firms 
with high tax rates than on firms with low tax rates. For firms with high tax rates in a 
given year, stronger shareholders rights have a significant impact. Amongst those firms, 
those with stronger shareholders rights have the lowest tax rates during the next two 
years. On the other hand, stronger shareholders rights don’t have a significant impact on 
tax burden for firms with low tax rates. 
 Overall, our results show that Corporate Governance plays a significant role for 
the firms that have excessive tax rates in a given year during the two next years. In fact, 
there is a significant difference between the behavior of firms with strong and weak 
shareholders rights, after a year of excessive tax rates. During the next two years, firms 
with stronger shareholders rights have lower taxes than firms with weaker shareholders 
rights, which suggest that stronger shareholders rights control excessive tax rates. 
However, there is no significant relationship between Corporate Governance and next 
years’ effective tax rates, after a year of low tax rates. This means that stronger 
shareholders rights have different impacts on next years’ tax rates, depending on 
whether firms have a current excessive tax rate or a current low tax rate, which supports 
our argument that current year’s tax rates must be taken into account when analyzing 
the connection between Corporate Governance and tax rates. 
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 Table 8 – Model 4 regressions for “excessive tax payers”. For all the regressions there were used year and SIC 
code industry controls. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * means 10% individual 
significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the corresponding variable and 
*** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are the observed t-statistic values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “EXCESSIVE TAX PAYERS” 
Dependent Variable: GAAP ETRt+k  
  
 
1 year after 2 years after 3 years after  
C  
-0,05336  -0,043463 -0,196242   -0,130952 -0,179773  -0,173374 
(-0,32791) (-0,263129) (-1,102475)  (-0,729979) (-0,93722) (-0,90089) 
E_INDEXt  
0,020754***  0,014651*  -0,003863  
(2,753193)  (1,935156)  (-0,485085)  
G_INDEXt 
 0,003471  -0,002106  -0,001962 
 (1,216336)  (-0,687644)  (-0,627057) 
LOG(ASSETS)t+k 
0,016313 0,016347 0,025014** 0,024001* 0,0283** 0,028536** 
(1,394144)  (1,390775) (2,001175) (1,916362) (2,140035)  (2,160025) 
CAP_INTENSITYt+k 
0,045142  0,056184 0,114658**  0,12091** 0,053935  0,053277 
(0,742434) (0,922596) (2,047858) (2,153927) (0,889765) (0,881263) 
BMt+k 
0,052392**  0,051522** 0,030091  0,030711 0,023415  0,022701 
(2,397582) (2,344743) (1,433686) (1,456209) (1,009222) (0,977586) 
DTEt+k 
-0,001081  -0,000656 -0,006856**  -0,00592* -0,001799  -0,001877 
(-0,280847) (-0,170036) (-2,917233) (-1,746369) (-0,487276) (-0,50932) 
D_EARNt+k  
0,115297***  0,116898*** 0,121636***  0,122512*** 0,135598***  0,136384*** 
(6,685521) (6,751802) (7,504314) (7,538272) (7,774633) (7,787946) 
ROAt+k 
0,05006  0,041322 -0,148591  -0,143518 -0,291065***  -0,293868*** 
(0,558762) (0,458994) (-1,633043) (-1,572827) (-2,746496) (-2,772721) 
 
R
2 
 
      
0,553839 0,550019 0,590155 0,588106 0,602234 0,602341 
Adjusted R
2
  0,24071 0,234209 0,315672 0,312251 0,326702 0,326883 
 
      
Sample Size  1211 1211 1093 1093 998 998 
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Table 9 – Model 5 regressions for “excessive tax payers”. For all the regressions there were used year and SIC 
code industry controls. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * means 10% individual 
significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the corresponding variable and 
*** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are the observed t-statistic values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “EXCESSIVE TAX PAYERS” 
Dependent Variable: CASH ETRt+k (5 years) 
  
 
1 year after 2 years after 3 years after  
C  
-0,790759  -1,216449* -0,106736   -1,475701 -1,407749  -3,170128*** 
(-1,22861) (-1,65907) (-0,109882)  (-1,455778) (-1,389506) (-3,038585) 
E_INDEXt  
0,062242**  0,115648***  0,099247**  
(2,168508)  (2,716869)  (2,625504)  
G_INDEXt 
 0,015181  0,038939**  0,051244*** 
 (0,995104)  (2,19078)  (3,398471) 
LOG(ASSETS)t+k 
0,079898* 0,105995** 0,030741 0,112373* 0,102508 0,202289*** 
(1,664424)  (2,211788) (0,474559) (1,755396) (1,541713)  (3,120129) 
CAP_INTENSITYt+k 
-0,027096  0,048118 -0,057942  0,062229 0,029736  0,071413 
(-0,132562) (0,236365) (-0,217229) (0,238413) (0,14285) (0,357966) 
BMt+k 
0,151938**  0,149659** 0,149855**  0,134102* 0,168282**  0,162027** 
(2,455153) (2,350523) (2,011152) (1,784627) (2,514826) (2,476568) 
DTEt+k 
-0,030013*  -0,026311 -0,040607*  -0,047768** -0,023501  -0,040717*** 
(-1,798484) (-1,562715) (-1,974384) (-2,207876) (-1,606621) (-2,73123) 
D_EARNt+k  
0,036515  0,023066 -0,028007  -0,036678 0,066318  0,042951 
(0,577195) (0,360278) (-0,339297) (-0,439389) (1,159288) (0,77691) 
ROAt+k 
-1,834351***  -1,758273 -2,020347***  -1,970553*** -1,652107***  -1,470862*** 
(-6,080635) (-5,800118) (-4,892054) (-4,736323) (-4,874665) (-4,585396) 
 
R
2 
 
      
0,790375 0,785221 0,796469 0,792258 0,878882 0,884329 
Adjusted R
2
  0,601712 0,59192 0,604811 0,596635 0,753815 0,7 
 
      
Sample Size  286 286 234 234 188 188 
 
      
30 
 
Table 10 – Model 6 regressions for “excessive tax payers”. For all the regressions there were used year and SIC 
code industry controls. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * means 10% individual 
significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the corresponding variable and 
*** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are the observed t-statistic values. 
 
  “EXCESSIVE TAX PAYERS” 
Dependent Variable: CASH ETRt+k (10 years) 
  
 
1 year after 2 years after 3 years after  
C  
0,994126 1,490382 1,813208**   2,111194** 3,078068*** 2,988107*** 
(1,546244) (2,118253) (2,34775)  (2,591058) (4,289047) (4,206102) 
E_INDEXt  
0,047257**  0,050595*  0,019947  
(2,029585)  (1,700061)  (0,644989)  
G_INDEXt 
 -0,017076  -0,008573  -0,000695 
 (-1,415594)  (-0,643096)  (-0,059922) 
LOG(ASSETS)t+k 
-0,036536 -0,051142 -0,090586* -0,097476** -0,17538*** -0,16553*** 
(-0,897423) (-1,200372) (-1,842607) (-1,923439) (-3,620874)  (-3,58444) 
CAP_INTENSITYt+k 
0,091076 0,133687 0,050685  0,104806 0,307845**  0,307691** 
(0,660998) (0,947576) (0,315964) (0,612087) (2,152059) (2,132188) 
BMt+k 
-0,005441 0,009876 0,052353  0,032336 0,007015  0,001569 
(-0,087371) (0,156017) (0,583682) (0,350514) (0,070353) (0,015657) 
DTEt+k 
0,005879 0,006941 0,011257  0,010609 0,010048 0,010725 
(0,99378) (1,164351) (1,643432) (1,508461) (1,295765) (1,381007) 
D_EARNt+k  
-0,050752 -0,058388 -0,06757*  -0,059003 -0,064107  -0,070257 
(-1,428477) (-1,639485) (-1,676513) (-1,381149) (-1,352951) (-1,508154) 
ROAt+k 
-0,429519** -0,406547** -0,497233***  -0,491762*** -0,522047**  -0,466195* 
(-2,587896) (-2,417156) (-2,725795) (-2,648448) (-2,076753) (-1,921014) 
 
R
2 
 
      
0,839301 0,836001 0,862848 0,858344 0,906734 0,906008 
Adjusted R
2
  0,729517 0,723963 0,756784 0,748797 0,818746 0,817336 
 
      
Sample Size  171 171 134 134 104 104 
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 Table 11 – Model 4 regressions for “tax savers”. For all the regressions there were used year and SIC code 
industry controls. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * means 10% individual 
significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the corresponding variable and 
*** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are the observed t-statistic values. 
 
 
 
 “TAX SAVERS” 
Dependent Variable: GAAP ETRt+k  
  
 
1 year after 2 years after 3 years after  
C  
-0,289258  -0,112331 0,044123   0,359205 2,004352  2,019944 
(-0,230759) (-0,093295) (0,033333)  (0,270529) (0,87362) (0,823635) 
E_INDEXt  
0,067381  -0,034618  0,094508  
(0,978961)  (-0,477505)  (0,619447)  
G_INDEXt 
 0,030453  --0,040153  0,018065 
 (0,921935)  (-1,164023)  (0,226966) 
LOG(ASSETS)t+k 
0,033613 0,010111 0,006525 0,001544 -0,118156 -0,11386 
(0,366241)  (0,114471) (0,065649) (0,015962) (-0,741882)  (-0,703722) 
CAP_INTENSITYt+k 
-0,231311  -0,17593 0,156495  0,14757 -0,841612  -0,864617 
(-1,233433) (-0,986425) (0,786079) (0,763304) (-1,343964) (-1,315226) 
BMt+k 
0,05931  0,114329 0,282438*  0,318995* -0,003886  0,007056 
(0,409976) (0,841652) (1,705936) (1,992398) (-0,015123) (0,025465) 
DTEt+k 
0,006346  0,004527 0,00494  0,00608 0,013088  0,01344 
(0,603923) (0,434398) (0,445086) (0,554616) (0,725922) (0,683912) 
D_EARNt+k  
-0,145297**  -0,151324** -0,08305  -0,079301 0,044693  0,031841 
(-2,118478) (-2,186105) (-0,913928) (-0,904187) (0,229211) (0,161263) 
ROAt+k 
0,292022  0,373616 0,309847 0,252406 0,233108 0,304331 
(0,988899) (1,311237) (0,85135) (0,717598) (0,33246) (0,433539) 
 
R
2 
 
      
0,859304 0,858998 0,887475 0,891277 0,877254 0,874713 
Adjusted R
2
  0,362561 0,361175 0,391662 0,412215 0,127732 0,121071 
 
      
Sample Size  223 223 174 174 148 148 
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Table 12 – Model 5 regressions for “tax savers”. For all the regressions there were used year and SIC code 
industry controls. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * means 10% individual 
significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the corresponding variable and 
*** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are the observed t-statistic values. 
 
  “TAX SAVERS” 
Dependent Variable: CASH ETRt+k (5 years) 
  
 
1 year after 2 years after 3 years after  
C 
0134698*** 0,127647*** 0,262305***  0,257209*** 0,313178***  0,317562*** 
(3,152868) (2,99054) (3,831884)  (3,74072) (2,912237) (2,943854) 
E_INDEXt  
0,001134  0,00285  0,003138  
(0,633401)  (1,050673)  (0,841141)  
G_INDEXt 
 0,001187*  0,001191  0,000201 
 (1,853562)  (1,286841)  (0,157189) 
LOG(ASSETS)t+k 
-0,003888 -0,003984 -0,013231*** -0,013209*** -0,015955** -0,015898** 
(-1,273588) (-1,310354) (-2,740636) (-2,726847) (-2,10205)  (-2,093724) 
CAP_INTENSITYt+k 
-0,011031 -0,010302 -0,000072  0,000337 -0,003139  -0,003368 
(-1,010827) (-0,946163) (-0,00414) (0,01932) (-0,120092) (-0,12879) 
BMt+k 
0,003643 0,004045 0,011459  0,011393 0,044282***  0,043802*** 
(0,705942) (0,789676) (1,479931) (1,473919) (4,181329) (4,139795) 
DTEt+k 
0,004652*** 0,004493*** 0,006406***  0,006253*** 0,009511*** 0,009458*** 
(3,921852) (3,800193) (3,75926) (3,681062) (3,685769) (3,664808) 
D_EARNt+k  
-0,018083*** -0,018279*** -0,017304*** -0,017038*** -0,035075***  -0,034772*** 
(-3,903626) (-3,952284) (-2,675827) (-2,638539) (-3,80915) (-3,776407) 
ROAt+k 
-0,049427** -0,049121** -0,064674**  -0,065326** -0,03825  -0,038169 
(-2,242376 (-2,233535) (-2,023303) (-2,043877) (-0,828456) (-0,826274) 
 
R
2 
 
      
0,738458 0,73917 0,696625 0,696808 0,794305 0,794115 
Adjusted R
2
  0,648847 0,649802 0,59318 0,593425 0,716961 0,7167 
 
      
Sample Size  1494 1494 1228 1228 1022 1022 
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Table 13 – Model 6 regressions for “tax savers”. For all the regressions there were used year and SIC code 
industry controls. For all the regressions it was used the OLS estimation method. * means 10% individual 
significance of the corresponding variable, ** means 5% individual significance of the corresponding variable and 
*** means 1% individual significance of the corresponding variable. In parenthesis are the observed t-statistic values. 
 
  “TAX SAVERS” 
Dependent Variable: CASH ETRt+k (10 years) 
  
 
1 year after 2 years after 3 years after  
C  
0,140952*** 0,135605*** 0,224124***   0,215532*** 0,586485***  0,59374*** 
(2,776548) (2,675425) (3,052206)  (2,934941) (5,315224) (5,41426) 
E_INDEXt  
0,003076**  0,002521  0,001862  
(1,921477)  (1,204665)  (0,658254)  
G_INDEXt 
 0,001468***  0,00132*  0,00124 
 (2,626367)  (1,928454)  (1,38783) 
LOG(ASSETS)t+k 
-0,005117 -0,005241 -0,009891* -0,009795* -0,03391*** -0,034933*** 
(-1,420877) (-1,460041) (-1,934719) (-1,921283) (-4,501306)  (-4,634036) 
CAP_INTENSITYt+k 
-0,002665 -0,000177 -0,014113  -0,012501 -0,009019  -0,007114 
(-0,244054) (-0,016373) (-0,958022) (-0,852247) (-0,469261) (-0,373284) 
BMt+k 
0,009361* 0,009009 0,001395 0,001599 -0,018127*  -0,01882* 
(1,665922) (1,610982) (0,180635) (0,207809) (-1,667224) (-1,775452) 
DTEt+k 
0,002204** 0,001673* 0,003376***  0,003028** 0,006952*** 0,006806*** 
(2,213115) (1,725071) (2,818441) (2,56823) (3,744083) (3,679047) 
D_EARNt+k  
-0,011098*** -0,011121*** -0,004948  -0,004778 -0,00604  -0,006229 
(-2,845467) (-2,861139) (-1,051859) (-1,018677) (-1,021477) (-1,055911) 
ROAt+k 
-0,049162** -0,051438** -0,109747***  -0,11246*** -0,072962**  -0,072214** 
(-2,445341) (-2,562447) (-4,367254) (-4,484527) (-2,01519) (-2,006523) 
 
R
2 
 
      
0,827486 0,828618 0,855943 0,856774 0,891149 0,891694 
Adjusted R
2
  0,764136 0,765683 0,799283 0,800442 0,843343 0,844128 
 
      
Sample Size  660 660 543 543 427 427 
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6. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Investigations’ Perspectives 
 
This paper tried to add some value to the existing literature that relates Corporate 
Governance characteristics with taxes. Previous literature on Corporate Governance and 
its fiscal consequences only focus on current year’s tax related variables. Our study tries 
to expand it, by not only analyzing current year’s tax rates, but also tax rates on the 
three years that follow an excessive or a low tax rate report.  
In the first place, using a similar methodology to Minnick and Noga (2010), we 
try to verify the effect of a firm’s Corporate Governance characteristics on current 
year’s effective tax rates. Using GAAP ETR and 5-year and 10-year CASH ETR as 
effective tax rates and E-Index, G-Index and Insider Ownership as Corporate 
Governance measures, we conclude that there is a positive significant relation between 
the Corporate Governance indexes’ scores and effective tax rates and a negative relation 
(although not significant) between Insider Ownership and effective tax rates. This 
suggests that stronger shareholders rights decrease current year’s effective tax rates, 
which is consistent with the findings of Minnick and Noga (2010). 
In the second place, we develop a new approach to the link between Corporate 
Governance and taxes. By defining two groups (“excessive tax payers” and “tax 
savers”) and by analyzing the effective tax rates for the three years that follow an 
excessive or a low tax rate, we conclude that amongst the firms that have excessive tax 
rates at a given year those who have stronger shareholders rights have the lowest 
effective tax rates during the following 2 years. This suggests that stronger shareholders 
rights control excessive tax rates. However, for the “tax savers” group, we find no 
evidence of Corporate Governance characteristics having any impact on effective tax 
rates during the 3 years following a low tax report. Overall, this new approach shows 
that Corporate Governance has a significant impact on taxes for firms with high tax 
rates but not for firms with low tax rates. 
Despite the results being encouraging, there must be made some considerations. 
The regressions of models 3 and 6 don’t evidence any relationship between 10-year 
CASH ETR and Corporate Governance variables. This lack of significance may be due 
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to changes of firms’ policies. In fact, it is very likely that, in a period of ten years, many 
firms’ policies and strategies, particularly those involving taxes, may change. Besides, 
in this study we omitted the effects of takeovers and managers’ replacements, which 
may also lead to different firms’ tax policies. We consider that 10-year CASH ETR 
could lead to more significant results if these effects were considered. Furthermore, 
Corporate Governance variable “Insider Ownership” isn’t significantly related to any 
effective tax rate, although there is an expected negative relation for all 3 models that 
use this variable. Additionally, G-Index lacks some significance, particularly on models 
4 to 6. However, Bebchuk et al. (2004) argue that E-Index is a more refined index. So 
we assume that G-Index has some governance provisions that may bias the results and 
may lead to this absence of significance.  
The analysis of hypotheses 2 and 3 were unprecedented and may lead to future 
investigations that regard the relation between Corporate Governance and taxes. In fact, 
there was no previous literature that supported the use of the reference effective tax 
rates for the definition of “excessive tax payers” or “tax savers” groups; hence future 
studies may use some other groups’ definitions to test the results of this study. We also 
only analyzed the effects of governance indexes for these hypotheses, but some other 
governance variables could be tested. Furthermore, our results suggest that Corporate 
Governance only has a significant impact on next years’ tax rates for firms with current 
year’s high tax rates. This means that when analyzing the relationship between 
Corporate Governance and taxes, it must be taken into account firms’ current year’s tax 
rates. Future investigations should take this into consideration when measuring the 
impact that Corporate Governance has on taxes. 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1. Appendix A – List of G-Index governance provisions 
 
 This appendix describes all 24 G-Index governance provisions (Gompers et al., 
2003). Most of these provisions result in an increase in management power and a point 
is added to a firm’s score if a provision is present. Cumulative Voting and Secret Ballot 
are the only two provisions that result in an increase in shareholder rights, and, in these 
cases, a point is added to a firm’s score if a provision is absent. 
 Antigreenmail Provisions – prevent transactions between a large shareholder and 
a company in which the shareholder agrees to sell his stock back to the company in 
exchange for the promise not to seek control of the company for a determined period of 
time. 
 Blank Check Preffered Stock – the board has authority to determine voting, 
dividend and other rights. 
 Business Combination Laws – if a transaction between a large shareholder and a 
firm is not approved by the board of directors, that operation will be delayed by at least 
2 years. 
 Bylaws and Charter Amendment Limitations – limit shareholders’ ability to 
modify corporation’s governing documents. 
 Cash-out Laws – allow shareholders to sell their shares to a large shareholder at 
a price based on the highest price of recently acquired shares. 
 Compensation Plans – changes in control of a company allows managers to 
accelerate the payout of bonuses or to cash out options. 
 Contracts and Indemnification – officers and directors are indemnified from 
legal expenses resulting from lawsuits. 
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 Cumulative Voting – a shareholder has the ability to allocate his total votes by 
any method desired. 
 Directors’ Duties – directors may consider other stakeholders than shareholders, 
like employees, communities and suppliers, when considering a merger. 
 Fair-price Provisions – limit the range of prices a bidder can pay. 
 Golden Parachutes and Silver Parachutes – a change in control of a firm that 
results in executives’ terminations or resignations lead to compensations to these 
executives. 
 Limitations on Director Liability – limit directors’ personal liability. 
 Pension Parachutes – avoid acquirers from using surplus cash in the pension 
fund of the target. 
 Poison Pills – holders have special rights in the case of hostile takeover bids. 
 Secret Ballot – a third party or employees count votes. 
 Severance Agreements – high-level executives have their positions assured or 
have compensations after a change in control. 
 Special Meeting Limitations – limit or eliminate the ability of shareholders to 
call a special meeting. 
 Staggered Board – only part of the board can be replaced each year. 
 Supermajority Requirements – establish voting requirements for mergers higher 
than the requirements of state law (typically 66.7, 75 or 85 percent). 
 Unequal Voting Rights – limit the voting rights of some shareholders. 
 Written Consent – actions are limited by the establishment of majority threshold 
beyond the level of state law. 
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8.2. Appendix B – List of E-Index governance provisions 
 
 This appendix enumerates all 6 E-Index governance provisions (Bebchuk et al., 
2004). All of these provisions result in an increase in management power and a point is 
added to a firm’s score if a provision is present. These 6 provisions are also present on 
the G-Index and, therefore, the description of each is available on the previous 
appendix. 
 Bylaws Amendment Limitations 
 Charter Amendment Limitations 
 Golden Parachutes 
 Poison Pills 
 Staggered Board 
 Supermajority Requirements 
